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When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions
when Antitrust Enforcement Resources are Scarce
Michal S. Gal*

I. INTRODUCTION

The adoption of antitrust law is a necessary but insufficient condition
for it to affect social welfare. Laws remaining on the books will not
change the conduct of market participants unless other indirect
inducements for abiding by laws exist, such as moral incentives or legal
sanctions. Such laws will not enable jurisdictions to reap the benefits of
lowering private barriers to trade, which include reducing the ability of
market participants to reap supracompetitive benefits based on anticompetitive acts and increasing the ability of others to participate in the
market game.
What, then, determines whether and how antitrust law will be
enforced? As elaborated elsewhere, antitrust is like a flower: in order to
bloom it needs soil (a supportive socio-economic ideology), pesticides
(tools to limit political economy influences), and water and sun
(efficient institutions).' Indeed, antitrust is not a stand-alone regulatory
tool; rather, it is part-and-parcel of a wider set of public policies in
pursuit of social welfare. As such, it is shaped and transformed by
existing socio-economic ideology and other policy tools that are
implemented. The experience of many jurisdictions clearly indicates
that it is only when the paradigms of public policy endorse market
functioning, rather than government action, as the cornerstone of
economic development, that antitrust begins to blossom.2 Antitrust is
* LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D. Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Forum for Law and
Markets, University of Haifa School of Law. Many thanks to Doron Rentsler for his excellent
research assistance.
1. Michal S. Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditionsfor Competition Law Enforcement
in Developing Countries, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMPETITION, COMPETITIVENESS
AND DEVELOPMENT:
LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 20,21 (Phillip Brunsick et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Gal, Ecology].
2. See, e.g., Ignacio De Le6n, A Market Process Analysis of Latin American Competition
Policy, UNCTAD Regional Meeting on Competition Law and Policy, San Jose, Costa Rica 1, 14
(August 2000) (stating that markets are flexible, evolving institutions that develop incentives
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also susceptible to regulatory capture which is strengthened by its nonsector-specific and long-term nature, 3 rendering it necessary to adopt
tools to overcome such obstacles.

institutional
enforcement
enforcement
law and for

Of no less importance is the

framework, which determines the quality of the legal
institutions. 4 The institutional setting should provide the
bodies with efficient and effective tools for enforcing the
educating market players in its provisions and benefits.

These three conditions are, of course, intertwined.

To illustrate, the

strength and locus of political economy obstacles should shape
institutional settings to reduce the ability and incentives of the
enforcement bodies to make decisions that favor specific interest
groups.
This paper focuses on the third condition: the institutional
framework. In particular, it seeks to explore whether the institutional
setting that is optimal for one jurisdiction would necessarily be efficient
for another; or, in other words, whether jurisdictions can simply "cut
and paste" the institutions of other efficient antitrust regimes into their
own laws. Much of the literature has focused on the obstacles to legal
transplant of substantive rules. 5
But are such problems also
encouraging firms to engage in exchanges).
3. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Reality Bites (or Bits): The Political Economy of Competition
Policy in Small Economies, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 605, 606 (Barry
Hawk ed., 2002) (describing the traits of antitrust to include non-sector specific principles and a
long-term horizon).
4. For the importance of institutional frameworks, see, e.g., ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, STUDY ON COMPETITION LAWS FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (1999)
[hereinafter APEC]; CONSUMERS UNITY & TRUST SOCIETY, FRIENDS OF COMPETITION: HOW TO
BUILD AN EFFECTIVE COMPETITION REGIME IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES
(2003); CONSUMERS UNITY & TRUST SOCIETY, PULLING UP OUR SOCKS: A STUDY OF
COMPETITION REGIMES OF SEVEN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA UNDER THE 7UP PROJECT (2003) [hereinafter CUTS, PULLING UP OUR SOCKS]; WILLIAM E. KOVACIC &
DECOURCEY EVERSLEY, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, AN ASSESSMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY: METHODS USED IN COMPETITION AGENCIES AND WHAT WORKED
FOR THEM (2007); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS
FOR MARKETS (2002); William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and
Consumer Protection Reforms in TransitionalEconomies: Perspectivesfrom Mongolia, Nepal,
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995); William E. Kovacic, Institutional
Foundationsfor Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2001).
5. The effect of cultural traits on the ability to transplant a law has generated a heated debate.
See, e.g., C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed., The University
of California Press 1977) (1748) (discussing environmental factors as a barrier to the
transportation of laws); FREDERICK CHARLES SAVIGNY, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 24 (Abraham Hayward trans., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
2002) (1831) (discussing how law has developed throughout history); Daniel Berkowitz,
Katherina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The TransplantEffect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003)
(analyzing whether legal transplants work); Spencer Weber Waller, Neo Realism and the
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encountered with regard to institutions?
Undoubtedly, jurisdictions have much to learn from the institutional
experience of others. Indeed, different institutional settings serve as a
laboratory for other jurisdictions. For example, the EU experience with
the system of notification and ex ante approval of restrictive agreements
by the Commission, which was prevalent until less than a decade ago,
revealed the high costs involved in such regulation. 6 Conversely, the
two-tiered merger notification system, under which only merging
parties that pass the first tier should provide extensive information on
the merger, has proven to be quite efficient. 7 Following the institutional
solutions of another jurisdiction carries significant advantages. These
from experience and saving the
include, inter alia, the ability to learn
8
design.
own
one's
creating
costs of
Still, can all the institutional success stories of other jurisdictions be
transplanted elsewhere? This paper argues that the answer is a definite
no. Even if a certain institutional design is optimal for one jurisdiction,
this does not guarantee that it will be beneficial for another. Most
importantly, institutional transplants can be unsuccessful if they are not
designed to deal effectively with the special characteristics of the
economic or
jurisdiction. Such characteristics include cultural traits and
9
sociological conditions and objectives that affect the law.
We make this point by focusing on one important institutional feature
of antitrust enforcement bodies: their institutional endowment. In
particular, this paper seeks to explore the effects of scarce enforcement
resources (both financial and human) on optimal institutional design.
Accordingly, the following question is raised: if a country has a small
institutional endowment, should it transplant the institutional structure
of another jurisdiction and simply shrink it to fit its budget-like the
shrinking of the house in Alice in Wonderland-or should it apply a
InternationalHarmonization of Laws: Lessons From Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV. 557, 568 (1993)
(analyzing the transferability of law from one nation and culture to another); Alan Watson, Legal
Transplants and Law Reform, 92 THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 79, 80-81 (1976) (arguing that
a nation could successfully borrow another's laws even when nothing was known about the
political, social, or economic context of the foreign law).
6. See, e.g., Damien Geradin, Competition Between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competition
Law, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2002) (providing an economic analysis of the European
Commission's proposals to modernize the implementation of competition law).
7. Such a system is prevalent, for example, in Austria, the EU, and the UK.
8. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Institutionsfor High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to
Acquire Them, 35 STUD. INCOMP. INT'L. DEV. 3, 7-8 (2000).
9. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 5; SAVIGNY, supra note 5; Berkowitz et al., supra
note 5; Waller, supra note 5; Watson, supra note 5.
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different institutional structure?
Resource scarcity is common in three types of jurisdictions: small,
developing, and transition economies. Indeed, such scarcity is one of
their most important-if not the most important--defining institutional
features. The prevalence of this characteristic makes it an interesting
and important subject to study. Naturally, other factors such as political
economy considerations affect institutional design as well. Yet, placing
the spotlight on resource scarcity serves to clarify one set of institutional
issues and solutions, which are central for the functioning of antitrust
regimes in many jurisdictions. It also highlights some limits to
transplanting solutions from jurisdictions with different resource
endowments.
Accordingly, the first part of the paper analyzes the effects of a
limited institutional endowment on antitrust law enforcement. In
particular, it is argued that such scarcity significantly affects the ability
to apply antitrust effectively. The second part analyzes the tools that
have been employed or that can be employed to limit such negative
effects. Such tools include long-term solutions, such as enlarging the
pool of professional human resources, and short-term ones, such as
prioritizing enforcement tasks. They include macro-solutions, such as
joining forces with other jurisdictions to form regional antitrust
agreements, and micro ones, such as motivating professional staff to
remain within the agency. Some of these solutions are easy to apply
and do not require significant investments and others are quite costly,
and thus are only justified where other tools are not workable.
One of the more interesting possible solutions relates to the interplay
between substantive rules and institutional structures. Indeed, it is often
this interplay that leads to inefficient antitrust decisions. Most
importantly, a combination of poorly equipped institutions with limited
economic expertise and antitrust laws that require complex analysis of
market conditions and their effect on welfare are apt to create erroneous
decisions. Viewed from this perspective, designing an antitrust regime
involves the creation of a delicate balance between institutional
conditions and substantive rules. Accordingly, this interplay will be
explored in depth. Given the novelty of the discussion in the context of
extreme resource limitations, it will be conducted in a separate part.
The analysis strengthens the claim that the institutional framework must
fit the special characteristics of the jurisdiction in which it is applied.
II. THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE SCARCITY

Scarcity of financial and human resources constitutes an important
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obstacle to establishing an effective system of antitrust enforcement.
This part will address this challenge.
A. EmpiricalEvidence

Imagine a world in which antitrust institutions enjoy unlimited
enforcement resources-both human and financial. In such a world,
enforcement would be optimal, within the boundaries set by substantive
rules and political influences. Needless to say, no jurisdiction enjoys
Even jurisdictions that enjoy quite significant
such conditions.
enforcement resources in absolute terms face an optimization problem.
Resource limitations are, however, a matter of degree. While no
jurisdiction can employ unlimited resources to all possible antitrust
issues, some jurisdictions must operate with extremely limited
institutional endowments, and these jurisdictions are our focus.
Three types of jurisdictions generally face significant resource
constraints: small, developing, and transition economies. Nonetheless,
the constraints they face differ in some respects. Small jurisdictions
(which are not developing or in transition) generally suffer from limited
financial resources but often have no significant human scarcity
constraints, other than those resulting from a small financial endowment
(quantity but not quality). Financial constraints result from the fact that,
even if per capita investment in antitrust enforcement is relatively large,
the small size of the population necessarily implies that the absolute size
of the resource endowment is small. This financial constraint is further
affected by the fact that the cost of conducting an antitrust investigation
is often not affected by size, and that the highly concentrated nature of
many of their industries raises a relatively large number of antitrust
issues. 10 Transition economies generally suffer from a human resource
constraint: professional economists and legal scholars with skills
necessary to apply antitrust effectively are oftentimes scarce. 11 This
results from the fact that the educational background of the available
cadre of professionals relates to a planned economy, not a market
economy. Finally, developing jurisdictions generally suffer from both
types of resource constraints-limited financial and human endowments
which result from their low level of development.
10. See MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY IN SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (The
President and Fellows of Harvard College 2003) [hereinafter GAL, SMALL ECONOMIES]
(exploring the implications of a small economy on the creation and implementation of
competition laws).
11. William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403, 419 (1997) [hereinafter Kovacic, Getting
Started].
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Indeed, empirical studies indicate that small and developing
jurisdictions often suffer from significant financial resource
constraints. 12 Human resource constraints are also often cited as a
major obstacle to enforcement. A survey of twenty-seven antitrust
agencies, conducted by the International Competition Network (ICN),
indicated that many small, developing, and transition economies suffer
from such constraints. 13 For example, the Estonian agency had no
people with knowledge and experience in antitrust at the time of its
inception. Likewise, a major challenge for the Barbados Commission is
the sufficiency of technical staffing to manage broad and varied
technical agendas. 14
These financial and human constraints are often intertwined. For
example, in small economies, a small financial endowment might result
in a small staff. One such situation is found in Barbados where
financial constraints have led to the employment of commissioners on a
part-time basis, which does not allow them to quickly develop the
specialist knowledge required for the enforcement of antitrust. 15

In

addition, civil service salary structures often restrict agencies from
recruiting and maintaining highly-skilled staff members. 16 Jamaica, for
example, faces serious problems in recruiting high level staff due to
very low salaries in the civil service. The Kenyan Competition
Commissioner stated that only by substantially increasing the
Commission's budgetary allocations will it be possible to have the
Commission "manned by high caliber and independent competition
economists and lawyers so as to safeguard the quality of investigations,
enforcement and compliance standards."' 17 Another common problem is
the loss of professional staff to the private sector after those individuals
have gained some experience within the agency, due to offers of high
12. See, e.g., APEC, supra note 4, § 2.9.4; CUTS, PULLING UP OUR SOCKS, supra note 4, at
55; KOVACIC & EVERSELEY, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that "establishing comparatively high
thresholds [of activity] may be the only means that impoverished agencies can use to focus scarce
resources on matters of the highest importance"); TAIMOON STEWART, UNIV. OF THE W. INDIES,
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF COMPETITION ISSUES IN SELECTED CARICOM COUNTRIES:
TOWARDS POLICY FORMULATION 184 (Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic
Research 2004).
13. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK (ICN), COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
SUBGROUP 2 - LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG COMPETITION
AGENCIES 27 (2006) [hereinafter ICN, LESSONS].
14. Id.at 27-28.
15. Id.at 28.
16. See, e.g., APEC, supra note 4, § 2.9.11; CUTS, PULLING UP OUR SOCKS, supra note 4, at
58 (noting the importance of attracting and retaining high quality staff).
17. REPUBLIC OF KENYA, MONOPOLIES AND PRICES COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at
17(1999).
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salaries18for trained individuals, especially where such individuals are
scarce.

B. Effects of Such Scarcity
Resource scarcity has significant effects on antitrust enforcement.
Indeed, sufficient resources are the bedrock of efficient antitrust
enforcement because they largely determine whether antitrust is
workable. The more effective the enforcement bodies are in detecting
and sanctioning legal violations, the more instances of anticompetitive
conduct will be prohibited ex post. More importantly, the institutional
conditions of the enforcing bodies affect the expectations of economic
actors and their incentives to engage in anticompetitive conduct in the
first place. The higher the possibility of detection and sanctioning, the
stronger the deterrence effects on market participants, and vice versa.
Let us first focus on the effects of human resource constraints, both
qualitative and quantitative. To be effective, the staffs of enforcement
institutions must possess the necessary skills to understand, analyze, and
apply effectively the legal rules in specific cases. This requires, inter
alia, adequate technical competence of the decision-maker in all stages
of the enforcement process-from the investigative stage until the final
reviewing body.' 9 Assume, for example, that a case investigator does
not understand the sometimes subtle differences between oligopolistic
coordination and cartelistic agreements. He might then be driven astray
by the cartel parties. Or, even more important for many developing
jurisdictions, perhaps the investigator cannot differentiate between
welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing activities of trade associations.
Antitrust authorities thus need to employ lawyers, economists, and
investigators who are qualified to understand and apply antitrust law.
Alternatively, assume that the reviewing body-whether a court, a
ministerial committee, or any other body-does not possess such skills
but must nonetheless scrutinize the decision of the antitrust authority.
Once again the risk of erroneous decisions may be quite high.
The welfare costs involved in erroneous decisions might be
significant and may well extend beyond the direct effects on the conduct
of the parties in a specific case. First, an erroneous decision might
impact the incentives of other market players to engage in pro-

18.

See, e.g., APEC, supra note 4, § 2.9.11 (noting the high staff turnover that has weakened

new competition authorities).
19. Of course, other conditions are also relevant, including impartiality and procedural and
evidentiary rules that allow the decision-maker to reach the necessary information. For the
purposes of this analysis, however, we assume that all other conditions exist.
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competitive or neutral conduct if it was not wrongly labeled as
anticompetitive. Conversely, it might strengthen the incentives of
market players to engage in anticompetitive conduct, if such conduct
was erroneously found to be legal. Second, it might undermine the
standing and reputation of the antitrust authority, especially where it
results in incompetent enforcement efforts such as the loss of many
cases brought by the authority. Particularly in its early years, the
antitrust agency might be required to convince the courts, as well as the
general public, that its cases are procedurally sound and substantively
meritorious. 20 It is vital that the agency be ready to prevail on such
issues, as this might determine the breadth and scope of the legal basis
for its future actions as well as its public standing and the confidence of
its staff in the organization. 2 1 The costs of erroneous decisions might
thus even be higher than if there was no regulation at all.
Human resource constraints might also lead to limited enforcement.
The lack of skilled personnel implies a limited ability to readily identify
offending practices, to respond to queries and complaints, to handle
complex matters, and to engage in educative activities. Additionally, a
study by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) reported
reluctance in several developing jurisdictions in applying antitrust due
to a lack of experience in competition cases and the difficulty in dealing
with cases that require economic judgment. A vicious circle has been
created
in which the courts never gain experience and cases are never
2
2

sent.

Finally, human resource constraints also affect the creation of a
competition culture. Increasingly, it is recognized that antitrust
authorities play an important role in the promotion of a competitive
environment by proactively influencing regulatory activities to ensure
the rejection of unnecessarily anticompetitive regulatory measures.
This advocacy role may, in some cases, be more important in promoting
competition than in the repression of anticompetitive behavior through
antitrust enforcement. Yet, if the agency is not sufficiently staffed, this
role will generally be one of the first to be harmed. The quality of
personnel can also affect the competition culture in an additional way:
the impact of the competition agency is often derived from the respect
2
for its senior figures.

3

20. Gal, Ecology, supra note 1, at 37.
21. Kovacic, Getting Started,supra note 11, at 431.
22. APEC, supra note 4, § 2.9.16.
23. Peter M. Holmes, Some Lessons from the CUTS 7-Up Comparative Competitive Policy
Project 9 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript).
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Let us now turn to the effects of limited financial resources. Assume
that all decision-makers are highly skilled professionals. Still, if
financial resources are limited, enforcement will be sub-optimal. This
is because the performance of many antitrust enforcement tasks requires
a significant monetary investment.
Some examples include
investigating a cartel and bringing it to trial, analyzing the effects of
allegedly monopolizing behavior, writing guidelines for enforcement,
analyzing the effects of a proposed merger, and creating or
strengthening the competition culture through interaction with
lawmakers, regulators, and the media. Accordingly, a resource shortage
poses severe constraints on competition enforcement, particularly in ex
officio cases. 24 It might thus prevent the enforcement agencies from
engaging in some activities which might have increased social welfare.
Indeed, the effect of financial resources on the ability of enforcement
agencies to carry out their tasks is borne out in the empirical evidence.
To give but a few examples, the Chilean agency was considered for
many years a "second tier" agency, despite the fact that most of the
prosecutors had been highly respected and influential individuals, due to
insufficient resources. 25 Conversely, the Zambian authority 26
was wellendowed, a fact that contributed to its ability to apply its laws.
In summary, the limited ability to employ needed financial and
human resources creates significant challenges that have to be
recognized and addressed for the successful implementation of an
antitrust regime.
III. LIMITED INSTITUTIONAL ENDOWMENT: PARTIAL SOLUTIONS
Having identified the constraints imposed on antitrust enforcement by

limited institutional endowments, we now turn to some possible
solutions. The issue is largely one of resource allocation and efficient
institutional design: making the best out of the existing endowment to
promote the attainment of antitrust policy goals.
The solutions analyzed below are largely cumulative: a jurisdiction
can apply all or some of them simultaneously as each serves to limit the
problem partially but not completely. The efficient mix might differ
among jurisdictions, depending on the severity of the constraint as well
as other factors that affect antitrust enforcement which determine a
jurisdiction's motivation or ability to employ a certain solution.
24. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 22.
25. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY INCHILE: A PEER REVIEW 25 (2004).
26. Holmes, supra note 23, at 6.
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Furthermore, the efficient solution within each jurisdiction might
change over time.
Some of these solutions have also been adopted by jurisdictions with
large resource endowments. Yet, as will be discussed at the end of this
part, a small endowment affects the motivation to adopt such solutions
as well as their application in practice.
A. Creatingand Attracting QualifiedStaff
As noted previously, attracting professional staff is a major obstacle
to antitrust enforcement in developing and transition countries. 27 A
long-term solution to the problem involves enlarging the pool of
available, qualified people who can work in the enforcement bodies.
Indeed, some jurisdictions have formed ties with local and foreign
universities in order to ensure that the courses that are relevant to
antitrust enforcement, such as antitrust law and industrial organization,
are taught.2 8 In the short run, staff training programs in procedural,
methodological, and substantive matters are a key mechanism for
overcoming human resource constraints. 29 Internships in more mature
agencies can also assist staff in gaining practical experience. Technical
cooperation agreements and exchanges with other competition agencies
are helpful as well. 3 ° Some jurisdictions also have experimented with
recruiting experts who are not attorneys or economists but are trained to
perform analytical and investigational tasks that are integral to the
handling of cases. Still others contract with outside counsel in
important cases. 31
To combat problems of high staff turnover rates, some agencies offer
training of staff on the condition of being bonded for several years. 32 A
survey by the ICN has indicated that some jurisdictions offer lifestyle
benefits-such as telecommuting, the availability of alternative work
schedules, and access to a day care center inside the competition
33
agency-that are not readily attainable in the private sector.
The ability of the authority to attract and retain staff is also
27. See also STEWART, supra note 12, at 184; ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13.
28. APEC, supra note 4, § 9.3.14.
29. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 14.
30. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPERIENCES GAINED
SO FAR ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON COMPETITION POLICY ISSUES AND THE
MECHANISMS USED 38 (2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD], availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/c2clp2 Ir2_en.pdf.
31. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 29-34; KOVACIC & EVERSELEY, supra note 4, at 11.
32. This was suggested, inter alia, in STEWART, supra note 12, at 9-10.
33. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 29-34; KOVACIC & EVERSELEY, supra note 4, at 11.
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determined by its standing and reputation within society. The
independence, transparency, and regard for due process all serve to
create an attractive working environment for high quality professionals.
Poland's successful antitrust authority, for example, took early action
and created a good reputation that set off a virtuous circle. Its advocacy
role reinforced its success, and it has continued to attract good staff and
political support.34 Yet a chicken and egg problem exists, because in
order to achieve a positive reputation, the authority will need a skilled
staff. Barbados tackled this problem by setting up the agency and
training its staff before its law was adopted so that the Commission was
ready to start operating by the time the law was passed. 3
B. Creatinga Collective Memory

To reduce human resource problems it is also important that
professional knowledge be accumulated in the agency and not totally
dependent on specific people. Guidance manuals may provide new staff
with access to the approach to be adopted. These should be supported
by case histories so that the
collective memory of the authority is easily
36
and continually available.
C. Bypassing Incompetent Decision-Makers

As noted above, in order to reach correct decisions, all the links in the
chain of decision-makers must be competent. If the antitrust agency's
decision-makers are incompetent, the suggestions elaborated above
might reduce the problem. Such solutions are more difficult to enforce
on the judiciary, which often plays an important role in the institutional
apparatus of antitrust enforcement.
A serious problem with the judiciary, encountered by many
developing and transition countries, is the low level of expertise of
judges in antitrust issues. 37 This stems from the judiciary's lack of
experience in antitrust cases and from its possible difficulty in dealing
with cases that require sophisticated economic analysis. The judiciary

34. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, WORKING GROUP ON CAPACITY BUILDING AND
COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
BUILDING CREDIBLE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES

31-33 (2003).
35. STEWART, supra note 12, at 206.
36. APEC, supra note 4, § 2.9.13.
37. Paul Cook, Competition and its Regulation: Key Issues, 73 ANNALS PUB. & COOP. ECON.
541 (2002); Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 11, at 420-21; A. E. Rodriguez & Mark D.
Williams, The Effectiveness ofProposedAntitrustProgramsfor Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209 (1994).
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may, then, issue decisions that are incompatible with the principles of
antitrust or resort to purely technical reviews instead of determining the
merits of the case. The problem of judicial competence is so significant
that Jamaica identified it as its main constraint in the implementation of
antitrust. 38 Similarly, Russia experienced enforcement problems due to
its judges' lack of experience and understanding of necessary economic
concepts.

39

Accordingly, some jurisdictions have devised ways to bypass
incompetent courts. A common solution is the creation of a specialized
antitrust tribunal, as in South Africa and Israel, which is exclusively
empowered to hear certain competition cases. 40 This allows a small
body of judges to develop experience in the application of antitrust.
Moreover, especially where the jurisdiction does not have many experts
in the field, a specialized tribunal might concentrate skilled individuals
in one institution. Another partial but common solution is to increase
the weight given to the decisions of the professional agency in the
review process.
D. Matching Commitments to Capabilities

Making the most out of one's resources is always sound advice.
However, when one's resources are scarce, this suggestion becomes
even more important. Accordingly, institutional arrangements must be
designed to match institutional capabilities.
First, the institutional structure should be designed to limit
duplications and inefficiencies. While the U.S. can, for example,
experiment with two different types of federal enforcement agencies
simultaneously, this will generally not be advised for jurisdictions with
much smaller enforcement endowments.
In addition, inefficient
regulatory tools, such as cumbersome merger approval procedures,
should be eliminated where possible.
Second, enforcement priorities should be set. Even the least funded
agency must develop a strategic plan that defines what it will seek to
achieve. 4 1 Indeed, there is considerable room for variation in
38. CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 34, at 35; see also APEC,
supra note 4, § 2.9.16, 2.9.21 (noting the difficulties in establishing workable competition laws
without a trained judiciary).
39. Id. § 9.5.4.
40. Id. at Annex 2, § 7.1; see also A. Neil Campbell et al., Rethinking the Role of the
Competition Tribunal, 76 CAN. B. REv. 297 (1997) (analyzing the role and effectiveness of the
Competition Tribunal in Canada, as well as discussing the procedural aspects of competition
tribunals and their relationship with the judiciary).
41. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 23-24; see KOVACIC & EVERSLEY, supra note 4, at 10-
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determining which commands a jurisdiction should adopt. Take, for
example, anti-cartel enforcement. Such enforcement should be given
priority when it relates to significant domestic cartels. This is especially
important in transition economies, in which anti-cartel enforcement
prevents continued patterns of inter-firm relationships that flourished
during the planning period. 4 2 Yet, prosecuting international cartels that
are prosecuted elsewhere should generally be given low priority. This
is because these cartels will usually cease their activities worldwide as a
result of such prosecution. Spending scarce resources on prosecuting
such a cartel rather than on cartels that will otherwise not be brought to
and
trial makes little sense. Indeed, empirical studies indicate that small
43
trial.
to
cartels
international
bring
rarely
developing jurisdictions
Third, resources should also determine the sequence of application of
antitrust prohibitions. For example, it may be advisable to first spend
resources on the most egregious and non-complex prohibitions, such as
hardcore horizontal restraints, and gradually add more complex
prohibitions. 44 It might also be advisable to give priority, at least in the
first years, to advocacy and education.
E. SharingEnforcement
Another way to optimize the use of a limited institutional endowment
is to share some regulatory functions with other regulators. One option
entails institutional integration between the antitrust authority and other
regulators. Integration might create a functional capability that would
not be possible otherwise given significant resource constraints. This
benefit must, however, be balanced with possible costs which include,
inter alia, negative spillovers from differences in regulatory frameworks
Yet functional
and inefficient prioritization of regulatory tasks.
integration as a solution for resource constraints might be especially
justified in micro-economies, such as Jersey and Guernsey, where

11 (discussing the organizational structure of competition agencies and the separation of distinct
functions).
42. KOVACIC & EVERSLEY, supra note 4, at 7 ("An anti-collusion measure in a competition
law could serve a useful purpose by making clear that the government will not tolerate private
efforts to recreate collective planning techniques that the jurisdiction has abandoned.").
43. CUTS, PULLING UP OUR SOCKS, supra note 4, at 71 ("Many [competition authorities] feel
that they are unable to enforce their decisions in cross-border competition cases even if they take
them up."); Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement
Challenges Faced by Small and by Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 26
(2009), availableat http://works.bepress.com/michal-gal3/.
44. KOVACIC & EVERSLEY, supra note 4, at 9 (noting how newer agencies and weaker
systems may begin with a more "austere" competition policy and over time implement additional
provisions to augment their law and enforcement capabilities).
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resource constraints are extremely pronounced.45 Some developing
countries have adopted such solutions as well. Peru's organizational
structure, which concentrates several mandates in addition to
competition enforcement within the antitrust authority, has kept down
its costs of small administrative units.46 Such integration is less
recommended, however, for transition economies, where one of the
tasks of the authority is to create a countervailing force to traditional
regulators who are more likely to rely on command-and-control
regulatory tools.
Sharing can also be done on a wider basis. Indeed, cooperation
agreements with other jurisdictions may provide an effective solution to
some institutional endowment constraints. 47 Regional cooperation can
create valuable means for developing new enforcement capabilities and
reducing costs. Such alliances may allow members to reduce costs and
human resource needs by consolidating certain functions in the regional
authority, such as the investigation and prosecution of region-wide trade
restraints, public education, or the strengthening of the competition
culture.48 Furthermore, the regional authority might reduce human
resource constraints by concentrating the region's skilled professionals
in one agency. On the other hand, cooperative agreements carry costs,
such as some loss of sovereignty and the conclusion of certain crossborder issues in a way that, despite increasing regional welfare, may not
entirely comport with the goals of a specific jurisdiction. Yet the
potential of regional agreements to significantly reduce resource
constraints has led to their proliferation among many developing and
small economies worldwide. Some examples include the Western
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Southern and
Eastern Africa Competition Forum (SEACF), and the Caribbean
45. Indeed, in Jersey the antitrust authority also performs some sector-specific regulatory
functions. Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority, About JCRA, http://www.jcra.je/cms3/
v2/public/cmsPage.asp?pagelD=l (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). Guernsey is contemplating
functional integration between the antitrust authority and the gas and electricity regulator.
Interview with Guernsey officials (Nov. 2009).
46. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 13, at 24.
47. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION
PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS

(Philippe Brusick et al. eds., 2005), availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
ditcclp20051%5Fen.pdf (summarizing national, regional, and international initiatives intended to
promote cooperative competition policy); UNCTAD, supra note 30, at 7 (addressing bilateral or
tripartite competition law enforcement cooperation agreements, as well as trade, customs, and
other market agreements and multilateral instruments).

48. KOVACIC & EVERSLEY, supra note 4, at 13 (advocating for multinational regional
cooperation in building competition institutions as a means to expand capabilities, provide
enforcement opportunities, and reduce costs).

2010]

When the Going Gets Tight

Community regional agreement (CARICOM).
Broader international initiatives also provide opportunities for
overcoming resource endowment limitations. Multinational bodies such
as the ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD provide useful mechanisms for
technical assistance by transferring information and know-how. In
addition, relationships formed in the course of participating in these
networks can facilitate formal and informal interaction between
individual competition authorities that might, in turn, serve to further
reduce enforcement
costs by sharing knowledge and investigative
49
techniques.
F. Stakeholder Sensitization and Participation

The antitrust authority performs a social function aimed at increasing
social welfare that benefits both consumers and competitors.
Empowering these beneficiaries to be involved in the enforcement
process may reduce the enforcement costs of the agency by transferring
some costs to such groups.
Indeed, in a growing number of
jurisdictions private enforcement plays a role in achieving the goals of
antitrust. 50 Yet some institutional conditions must exist before private
enforcement will be socially beneficial; most importantly, courts must
be able to correctly apply the law.
Educational measures, aimed at stakeholder sensitization, may reduce
enforcement costs in three main ways. First, they strengthen the
motivation of consumer groups to assist the authority in detecting
violations, which in turn serves to reduce investigation costs. 51 Second,
they may assist in disseminating information about legal prohibitions
and possible sanctions. Third, they reduce the investment of the
authority in countering political pressures by sector-specific groups by
creating a stronger public opinion in favor of competition.
G. Discussion: The Effects of a Limited InstitutionalEndowment on
Solutions

The solutions elaborated above all serve to reduce the negative

49. Id. (noting the importance of informational exchange, the formation of regional
relationships, and institutional interaction).
50.

AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF

COMPETITION LAW (forthcoming 2010).
51. RIT SENGUPTA & CORNELIUS DUBE, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT,
COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCES FROM DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
AND
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
INVESTMENT
13
(2008),
available
at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/55/40303419.pdf.
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welfare impact of a limited institutional endowment. 52 Some solutions
have been tried and tested in jurisdictions with antitrust regimes that do
not suffer from significant resource constraints. The EU regional
antitrust enforcement agreement, the U.S. private action doctrines, and
the Canadian Competition Tribunal all serve as such examples. Their
success or failure can guide jurisdictions with more limited institutional
endowments as well. Of course, their success also depends on factors
that go beyond institutional endowments, such as political pressures, the
prevailing socio-ideology, and cultural constraints.
A low level of resource endowment has, however, three main effects
on such solutions. First, it often strengthens the need for their adoption.
While other jurisdictions can achieve reasonable enforcement, for
example, without limiting institutional duplication, this might not be
true in highly constrained jurisdictions. Second, their adoption in
jurisdictions with no significant resource constraints might be primarily
motivated by other considerations. The EU regional agreement, for
example, was largely motivated by the wish to create a common market
to overcome historic rivalries rather than by the need to use scarce
resources efficiently. This effect of resource scarcity is especially
important where the solution carries costs, such as the loss of
sovereignty, which must be balanced against reduced enforcement
costs. Accordingly, while a certain solution might not be optimal for
most jurisdictions in which resources are abundant, it might be so when
resources are scarce. This leads to the third effect, which is that
resource scarcity may also impact the application of the solution in
practice. To illustrate, prioritizing enforcement is a good tool for all
jurisdictions as they all face some resource constraint. Yet the degree of
the constraint will affect the content of the set priorities. Moreover,
resource scarcity will affect the optimal mix of solutions to be applied
in a certain jurisdiction.
Not all solutions can be copied from jurisdictions with large resource
endowments, however. Given that jurisdictions face a different set of
institutional issues, the proper mix of solutions must be developed
locally or mirror the practices of jurisdictions which face similar
issues. 53 To give but one example, combining antitrust and sectorspecific enforcement is rarely found in such jurisdictions, and if it is
found, it is largely motivated by considerations other than resource
52. This paper does not attempt to enumerate all such solutions, but only the most important
ones.
53. Rodrik, supra note 8, at 7, 10-15 (discussing regulatory institutions and how they are
acquired among varied jurisdictions).
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scarcity.

IV.

DESIGNING APPROPRIATE SUBSTANTIVE RULES

All the solutions elaborated above have one common trait: they are
based on the assumption that substantive legal rules are given. This Part
relaxes this assumption and treats substantive legal rules and

institutional features as integrated parts of one system which has to be
designed effectively.

Viewed from this perspective, the interplay

between these two factors might sometimes lead to changes in
substantive law due to institutional limitations, rather than to
institutional design solutions.

This analysis thus broadens the set of

options to deal with institutional endowment

shortcomings

to

additionally include the content of substantive rules.
The effect of institutional limitations on antitrust rules is, of course,

not relevant only to jurisdictions with scarce enforcement resources.
Indeed, decision theory, which provides a theoretical framework for
designing efficient rules under assumptions pertaining to the ability of

the decision-maker to reach correct decisions, 55 has been applied to U.S.

and EU antitrust. 56 Yet there is no in-depth exploration in the literature

of the application of this framework in extreme conditions of limited
institutional endowments. Accordingly, this Part is dedicated to such an
analysis. First, it develops the argument that a possibly effective
solution to some institutional endowment issues involves changing the

content of substantive rules. Second, it explores the possible costs of
such a solution, especially in an international setting, in order to provide
54. Australia has combined such functions, but for reasons other than resource scarcity.
55. For the pioneering work on this subject see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (examining the legal
process and regulatory efficiency from an economics standpoint).
56. See, e.g., C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999) (joint ventures and other horizontal restraints); Arndt
Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules
Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason," 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 (2006)
(concluding that economics should be employed to develop appropriate competition rules, rather
than relying on a case-by-case examination); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing
Antitrust Rules for Assessing UnilateralPractices:A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
73 (2005) (unilateral practices); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Excessive Prices: Using
Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 97 (2005)
(excessive prices under EU competition framework); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying
Law and Policy: A Decision-TheoreticApproach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001) (tying doctrine);
Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the
Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (2006) [hereinafter
Popofsky, Exclusionary Conduct] (exclusionary rule under Section 2); Mark S.Popofsky, Section
2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1265 (2008) [hereinafter
Popofsky, Safe Harbors](Section 2 safe harbors).
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a balanced framework to determine in which situations its use is
advisable.
A. Changing Substantive Rules as a Solution to a Limited Endowment
Optimal deterrence entails prohibiting anticompetitive conduct and
allowing neutral or pro-competitive conduct. In practice, however, this
goal is difficult to attain given informational and institutional limitations
which might lead to erroneous or costly decisions. Erroneous decisions
fit into two main categories: (1) those that apply the regulatory net too
narrowly and thus do not capture conduct that is socially harmful (false
negatives); and (2) those that apply the regulatory net too widely and
prohibit conduct that is socially desirable (false positives). Erroneous
decisions can cause significant deviations from optimal deterrence
because they will not only bind the litigating parties but also guide other
market participants. 5 7 Such errors can result from partial information or
from the inability of the decision-maker to use the information
correctly. A rational social planner must therefore consider the relative
merits and the error and enforcement costs associated with alternative
legal tests, recognizing the real-world circumstances-including
institutional limitations-in which those tests are applied or enforced.5 8
Decision theory provides a theoretical framework for such analysis
by balancing the relative costs and benefits involved in the application
of different rules under given institutional limitations.
Relevant
considerations in selecting the appropriate test include not only the
likely consumer harms and benefits from the conduct but also the risks
of false positives, false negatives, and legal process costs resulting from
systemic limitations. 59 To illustrate, assume that the application of a
certain law requires a complex and costly market analysis. Such a
situation will lead to high informational costs or, alternatively, to high
error costs. This is because if the costly information is not obtained,
then the decision-maker is prone to reach mistaken decisions that are
based on only partial information. The social planner will thus have to
balance the two types of costs in order to reach an efficient rule.
Although decision theory often focuses on information costs, its
framework is sufficiently wide to include other limitations which lead to
erroneous decisions, such as a limited ability to correctly apply antitrust
57. Beckner & Salop, supra note 56, at 51 (describing how decisions from a court serve a
precedent "by which future conduct will be judged" and thus over- or under-deterrence can have
a negative impact by influencing other market participants).
58. Popofsky, Safe Harbors,supra note 56, at 1296.
59. Popofsky, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 56, at 449-50 (describing the costs and
effects of legal tests in reference to the decision theory framework).
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rules even when all the relevant information is available.
Enforcement resource scarcity affects the costs involved in applying
substantive rules in two main ways. First, given low financial
endowments, the decision-maker will have a limited ability to gather the
relevant information where gathering such information is costly. This,
in turn, might lead to higher degrees of erroneous decisions, since the
decision will be based on partial information. Alternatively, it might
lead to a lower number of decisions if resources are spent on gathering
information in a select number of cases. Second, and often more
importantly, human resource limitations might lead to the
misapplication of rules. Misapplication is often the result of the
decision-maker's lack of ability to perform a complex economic or legal
analysis even when all the relevant information is available. 60 This is a
serious concern. As our understanding of economics develops,
generally the economic models become more complicated and require
more nuanced, in-depth, and fact-specific analysis of each specific case
in order to minimize false positives. The cost of such rules is increased
demands on levels of competence and increased financial costs of
application. In large, developed jurisdictions, application of complex
rules often makes perfect sense-given the generally high level of
expertise of the enforcement institutions, error costs are often low. But
once we transfer such complex laws to jurisdictions with a much more
limited ability to perform such analysis, error costs will be significantly
increased.
Accordingly, laws which may be efficient under certain institutional
conditions might instead generate high error or application costs under
inferior institutional conditions and might even reduce domestic
welfare. 61 Consider, for example, a rule that bases the proof of market
power on an in-depth economic analysis of the conditions in the market,
including the height of entry barriers. The application of such a rule
would require significant economic expertise and would likely involve a
costly exercise in the study of the market. Compare it to a rule which
creates presumptions of market power based on market shares. The
application of the latter might be much less demanding where markets
60. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundationsfor Economic Legal Reform in
Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy andAntitrust Enforcement, 77 CHt.-KENT

L. REv. 265 (2001) (analyzing economic law reform in transition economies through the
development of competition systems).
61. In a study of eighteen Eastern European countries that are newcomers to antitrust, Dutz
and Vagliasindi found that the "Institutional Effectiveness" variable showed the strongest impact
on domestic competition.
Mark A. Dutz & Maria Vagliasindi, Competition Policy
Implementation in Transition Economies: An EmpiricalAssessment, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 762,

770-71 (2000).
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are relatively easily defined. To determine the desirability of such legal
presumptions the social planner would need to balance the reduced
administrative costs and the effects of the increase in enforcement that
might result from the savings of such costs on the incentives of market
players to engage in anti-competitive conduct, against the increase in
error costs that will result from a less nuanced analysis of market power.
A rule based on a legal presumption might therefore
be justified in
62
jurisdictions with limited institutional endowments.
Similarly, institutional endowments should play a role in determining
the scope of the application of rules. Merger regulation serves as a
good example. A regulatory model based on ex ante notification and
authorization is quite resource-consuming, given that the authority must
review all mergers that meet the threshold. This fact will have spillover effects on other areas of enforcement, given that the authority
generally has one pool of enforcement resources for all its activities.
Thus, some modifications might be necessary in order to create a more
efficient enforcement system within the existing endowment. In
particular, the scope of merger review might be limited. One option is
to increase the threshold for notification. Another is to abolish
mandatory notifications. In New Zealand, for example, there are no
mandatory merger notification thresholds. The commission has the
power to disintegrate a merger if it harms competition significantly, and
the merging parties can control this risk by applying for clearance. 6 3 In
other jurisdictions creating a "corridor" for merger review might
provide an efficient solution.
Let me elaborate on the "corridor" notification system, which is
currently considered in Guernsey and might serve micro-economies
particularly well.6 4 Under this system, notification should be required
only from mergers that fall within a "corridor" between a minimum and
a maximum threshold. The minimum threshold should be set to ensure
that mergers that have limited economic effects would not need to be
scrutinized. The innovation of this suggestion is the addition of a
maximal notification threshold: notification would not be required from

62. In small economies such presumptions are further justified by relatively low elasticity of
supply. See GAL, SMALL ECONOMIES, supra note 10, ch. 4 (introducing the tools that are
available to competition authorities to regulate natural monopolies in order to achieve
competition policy goals).
63.

NEW ZEALAND COMMERCE COMMISSION, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS GUIDELINES 6

(2004), availableat http://www.comcom.govt.nzfPublications/ContentFiles/Documents/
MergersandAcquisitionsGuidelines.pdf.
64. The author served as an advisor to the government of Guernsey on the shaping of its
Mergers and Acquisition Legislation, which is still in its legislative stages.
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mergers that are above a certain threshold. The threshold should
capture mergers between international firms with very high world-wide
turnovers which are not headquartered in the reviewing jurisdiction.
This is not because such mergers may not have significant effects on the
micro-jurisdictions' markets, although in many cases this will be true.
Rather, the reason is more practical: such mergers would rarely, if ever,
be dropped if they were not cleared by the micro-economy's authority.65
The resources spent in the merger review process of such mergers are
thus often wasted. Such a notification system can be coupled with a
rule enabling the authority to impose, within a given time frame,
behavioral or structural remedies on the merged entity that apply only to
its activities within the jurisdiction, much like the system in New
Zealand. This system would significantly reduce enforcement costs
while not necessarily increasing the practical costs from false negatives.
In sum, institutional endowments should be taken into account when
designing substantive rules. Relevant factors include: (1) enforcement
costs, where the more complex the rule, the more resources must be
spent in applying it in practice and the more limited the ability of the
decision-maker to make additional decisions; (2) error costs, resulting,
inter alia, from the level of economic or legal expertise of the decisionmaker; (3) the level of harm created by the relevant conduct; and (4) the
ability to enforce the rule in practice.
B. Considerationsfor Changingthe Content of Rules

So far we have focused on the benefits involved in reducing the level
of complexity or the scope of an antitrust rule in order to reduce costs
resulting from limited institutional endowments. The creation of
idiosyncratic rules in accordance with specific institutional endowments
might, however, come with a high price tag.
Idiosyncratic changes necessarily create a discrepancy between one's
laws and those of other jurisdictions with different institutional
endowments, most importantly the laws of large, established
jurisdictions. This discrepancy will limit the benefits involved in
following the latter, which are enumerated hereafter. 66 First, the
adoption of "ready made" and pre-tested rules saves the costs of
determining what content ought to be given to the law. Second, an

65. See, e.g., GAL, SMALL ECONOMIES, supra note 10, ch. 6; Gal, supra note 43, at 31-32
(discussing the disincentives on micro-jurisdictions to bring antitrust actions against large
international mergers).
66. For a more elaborate analysis see Michal S. Gal, The 'Cut and Paste' of Article 82 of the
EU Treaty in Israel: Conditionsfor a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J.L. REFORM 467 (2007).
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established antitrust law has a long history of implementation,
interpretation, and academic discourse in its saddlebag. Foreign courts,
enforcement agencies, and market players can thus tap such resources to
understand the transplant's concepts and how it should be applied in
practice. Furthermore, the continued application of the living law in a
generally well-functioning jurisdiction generates ongoing positive
network externalities: as more decisions and guidelines that apply the
law to various factual settings accumulate, legal certainty is typically
increased. Third, the transplant can also help push through new
concepts and ease their acceptance. The adoption of a foreign law that
is perceived to be successful can help convince local constituencies of
its importance and can assist the government in combating groupspecific political pressures.
Additional benefits arise when we add trade to the analysis. 67 Some
large jurisdictions require that their trading partners prohibit
anticompetitive conduct to prevent the creation of artificial barriers to
trade. Following their laws ensures at least some degree of compliance
with this requirement. Another benefit is a reduction in the learning and
compliance costs of firms wishing to trade beyond their jurisdiction.
Transplant jurisdictions reduce the costs for domestic exporters of
learning which antitrust issues they might face in the followed
jurisdiction.
In addition, transplanting an antitrust regime may
strengthen pro-competitive pressures in the domestic market by
increasing the incentives of foreign firms to import into it. Moreover,
unification of legal rules might better enable antitrust authorities to
work together towards joint solutions and to engage in cooperative
educational efforts. Such benefits are dependent, of course, on the
transplanted law not being unduly burdensome and not significantly
diverging from one's optimum law.
The above analysis indicates that the content of domestic laws is
affected by other jurisdictions. To paraphrase John Donne, "no
[country] is an island, entire of itself."'6 8 Indeed, tailoring institutional
structures to special needs might be much easier, in some respects, than
tailoring substantive rules. While there is often external pressure on
jurisdictions to harmonize substantive laws, there is less pressure on
harmonizing institutions, so long as the outcome meets some common
standards.

67. Id. at 478-80, 482-83. But see id. at 481-82 (discussing some "unintended results" of
Israel's whole-cloth adoption of Article 82 from the European Commission).
68.

JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, AND SEVERAL STEPS IN MY

SICKNESS 415 (1624).
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This does not imply, however, that no change to substantive rules
will be warranted to solve institutional endowment issues. Rather, in
situations in which error or enforcement costs are significantly high,
reducing the complexity and informational requirements involved in
applying a certain antitrust rule, or even abolishing the prohibition,
might well be justified. Alternatively, at least some of the benefits
elaborated above can be retained if jurisdictions with relatively similar
institutional endowments adopt similar solutions.
It is interesting to note that institutional endowment issues have
already created obstacles to harmonization. The failure of the attempt to
include a prohibition against hardcore cartels within the WTO
framework can be partly attributed to institutional endowment issues.
All countries were, in principle, in favor of prohibitions against hardcore cartels. Developing jurisdictions, however, voiced two main
concerns against the use of the WTO institutions to ensure the
application of such prohibitions. First, they were concerned that joint
ventures which serve to further industrial policy would be deemed
illegal. Second, and more important for our analysis, they were
concerned that due to their limited institutional endowments they would
not be able to meet enforcement requirements and would then be
sanctioned in accordance with WTO rules. 69 Institutional limitations
must therefore not be disregarded when harmonization of substantive
rules or the creation of international mechanisms for increasing
enforcement are considered.
V. CONCLUSION

For many years the design of substantive rules has overshadowed
institutional design issues. Today there is growing consensus that
institutional issues are no less fundamental to the successful
implementation of antitrust. 70 As Popper and Kegan suggest, law is like
a fortress-it should be properly built and manned in order to protect its
71
citizens.
Yet properly manning the fortress is too often quite a challenging
task. One of the main institutional problems that antitrust authorities
face is resource scarcity-both financial and human. Institutional

69. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS
1108 (2007).
70. See KOVACIC & EVERSLEY, supra note 4, at 1 ("Both older and newer competition

systems have come to realize that a body of competition laws is only as good as the institutions
entrusted with their implementation.").
71. KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM 66 (1957).
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endowment constraints can severely limit the ability of antitrust
enforcement bodies to perform their tasks effectively. This problem is
most pronounced in developing, small, and transition economies.
Finding adequate solutions to such constraints is thus necessary for
antitrust to take effect. Otherwise, the law might not achieve its goals
and instead create a negative reaction to its enforcement in the general
public and in other governmental arms.
Accordingly, this paper has identified some institutional design and
substantive law solutions that may assist jurisdictions in meeting their
antitrust goals. These solutions attempt to enable jurisdictions to make
the best out of their existing endowments within the framework of more
general constraints.
Some solutions have been tried and tested in jurisdictions with
established antitrust regimes that do not suffer from significant resource
constraints. Not all solutions can be copied from such economies,
however. Given that different jurisdictions face different sets of
institutional issues, some solutions or the proper mix of solutions must
be developed locally or follow the successes of jurisdictions which face
similar issues. 72 Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that large,
developed jurisdictions have adopted the useful institutional mix that
could underpin antitrust enforcement under conditions of severe
resource constraints. To give but one example, combining antitrust and
sector-specific enforcement is rarely found in such jurisdictions, and if
so, it is largely motivated by considerations other than resource
scarcity. 73 However, such a solution might be a useful way to
overcome institutional endowment limitations for micro-economies.
Indeed, the analysis indicated that resource scarcity affects both the
motivation to adopt certain institutional tools as well as their application
in practice. Furthermore, the application of a decision-theoretic
framework taking into account institutional limitations indicated that the
adequacy of legal provisions is also based on, inter alia, the
jurisdiction's institutional capabilities.
Substantive rules that are
optimal for one jurisdiction thus might not be optimal for another and
should be changed in accordance with institutional endowments.
Accordingly, the institutional repertoire available in large, developed
countries may be inappropriate to meet the needs of jurisdictions which
operate under conditions of severe resource scarcity. While in some
cases the analogy to Alice in Wonderland is appropriate-the institution
72. Rodrik, supra note 8, at 11-15 (discussing and analyzing the blueprint and localknowledge perspectives for institutional development).
73. Australia has combined such functions, but for reasons other than resource scarcity.

2010]

When the Going Gets Tight

should be shrunk to the size of the institutional endowment-in other
cases resource scarcity will require a new blueprint of solutions.
Institutional transplants thus also raise issues of compatibility, just like
the substantive
law issues which have been explored in depth in the
74
literature.

74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

